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Abstract
The latest version of ZigBee oﬀers improvements over many aspects like low power consumption, ﬂexibility and inexpensive
deployment. However problems persist, as the enhanced protocol still has many security weaknesses due to the fact that constrained
wireless sensor network devises cannot uses standard security protocols such as public key cryptography mechanisms. In this paper,
we highlight relevant security concerns related to ZigBee security features, then we propose a new approach suitable for ZigBee
enabled wireless sensor networks. The proposed solution decreases considerably the likelihood of successful attacks,and reduces
security impact in the event of a node compromise. Lastly we discuss the security and performance related to the proposed scheme.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of things (IoT) is becoming quickly a reality and wireless sensor networks are going to be certainly
widely deployed in the near future. Indeed, wireless sensor networks play an important role in IoT and are considered
as an emerging technology with a wide range of applications in many areas. Their importance increases especially
with the fast progress of their implementation. Therefore, security becomes a pressing need.
ZigBee is known to have many appealing advantages like low-cost, high reliability and low-complexity6, and has
a wide application range, whether in industrial automation, intelligent control, or medical health etc. But ZigBee
still faces many challenges, such as computing restrictions of nodes, limited memory space, and constrained energy
consumption and communication capability. These restrictions make it unpractical to apply classical security mech-
anisms like public key cryptography. That is why it is important to further study this topic, and focus more research
activities on this speciﬁc area.
Our contribution: we summarize our contribution as follows:
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• In the original version of ZigBee, the protocol have nine exchange messages. This type of protocols require
a number of operations that is linear with the number of nodes in the system, which might be impractical
since wireless sensor networks can consist of a great number of nodes. Our approach needs only four message
exchanges to fully complete the process of a secure communication.
• ZigBee protocol suﬀers from serious weaknesses related to key distribution, as keys are transmitted either over-
the-air or preinstalled onto the devices in an insecure way. Furthermore, all nodes share the same Master key.
Thus, the compromise of one single node jeopardizes the entire network. In our solution, each node has a private
key to limit successful attacks. Moreover, a one-time-use session key is used to secure the communication
between two nodes, and cannot be further used in future communications. Thus, our approach reduces the
security impact in the event of a node compromise.
• ZigBee protocol uses a frame counter to provide freshness protection. In other words ordered sequence of inputs
are used to reject frames that have been replayed. We show that this approach is not eﬃcient. In our solution,
we suggest to use a timestamp or a random values as a nonce to prevent replay attacks.
• The proposed approach relies on simple operations and does not involve computationally expensive crypto-
graphic operations to provide protection against several attacks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is an overview of ZigBee security architecture. In Section 3
we highlight the most relevant security issues related to ZigBee. Our solution is presented in Section 4. We also
discuss the security and performance of our solution in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. ZigBee Security Architecture
We present the key points that are needed for a clear understanding ZigBee security architecture, and we omit the
details that are not directly relevant to our work. However, a detailed survey on ZigBee security can be found in1 9.
We also refer the reader to the related works in this extended version of this paper.
Three types of keys are available in ZigBee technology: Master, Link and Network keys.
• Master keys: Considered as the most important keys among communicating nodes. These keys are used in the
Key Establishment Procedure called SKKE (Symmetric Key Key Exchange) to keep the exchange of link keys
between two nodes conﬁdential. They are pre-installed in each node during the manufacturing of devices, or
may be set up over-the-air in the ZigBee network. These are usually shared among all nodes. New nodes also
use the master key through SKKE protocol to set up the link keys with the other nodes.
• Link keys: these keys are used to encrypt all the information exchanged between two nodes. They are managed
by the application level, and are unique between each pair of nodes.
• Network key: Initially generated by the Trust Center, these keys aim to protect against outsider attacks with
little resources needed. They might also be regenerated at diﬀerent intervals and are necessary for the new
nodes to join the network. They are 128b keys and are shared among all devices in the network.
ZigBee network uses a Trust Center8 to decide whether or not new nodes are authorized to join the WLAN. Usually
there is only one Trust Center that broadcasts messages using the network key which all members can distinguish.
The old network key is used in case a new one needs to be spread through the network. The frame counter is used to
reject replayed frames and is also updated in this situation. Both network and link keys can be installed on each pair
of devices. However for increased security the link key is always used, although more memory space is required.
ZigBee key establishment protocol has two diﬀerent cases according to the conﬁguration of TC. In Case 1, TC creates
the LK itself and sends it to each principal. Therefore, the initiator and the responder have no role in the creation of
LK. In Case 2, TC creates the Master Key MK and sends it to each principal. Using this MK, A and B initiate an
SKKE procedure to establish LK. In this case the two principals create LK mutually using SKKE protocol. At the
end of a successful run the two principals will be able to establish secure communication using the encryption key
LK.The related scenario is visualized in Fig. 1. We describe the procedure in details as follows:
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Fig. 1. ZigBee key establishment scenario
• Message 1: The initiator A begins the communication with the responder B by sending the ﬁrst request message
to the Trust Center.
• Message 2 and 3: TC sends the Master Key MK to each principal.
• Message 4: A sends B his request to start SKKE.
• Message 5: B receives the SKKE request from A. The messages (4) and (5) are encrypted by MK, which was
received in the previous two messages. The remaining four messages represent the SKKE protocol itself.
• Messages 6 and 7: These steps include the challenges (NA, NB) of the principals encrypted by MK.
• Messages 8 and 9: Include a complex messages which can be computed by both parties to verify each other5.
3. Security Concerns
Relevant security weaknesses related to ZigBee protocol are presented as follows:
1. Key distribution: The ﬁrst vulnerability of ZigBee network is key distribution, as security keys are transmitted
in ZigBee networks either over-the-air, or preinstalled onto the devices in an unsecure way2. There are diﬀerent
key distribution approaches depending on the security level:
• Using the High Security level, the network key is encrypted and transmitted over the air using the Master
key, which is shared among all nodes. Thus, the compromise of one single node leads to an untrusted
relationship between all communicating devices in the network.
• Using the Standard Security level, the safety of the system becomes even more critical as the network key
is transmitted unencrypted over-the-air. Therefore, the Standard Security level has serious vulnerabilities
and cannot be recommended for security purposes.
• Using preinstalled network keys onto each legitimate device of the ZigBee network. This is done manually,
and is not practical specially when the network size is large.
2. Frame counter: In ZigBee speciﬁcation the notion of frame counter is oﬀered as a security service and empha-
sized as the freshness protection. It uses an ordered sequence of inputs to reject frames that have been replayed.
The counter will normally reset if a new key is created. The sequential freshness is used in this context to prevent
malicious attacks. But it is not a strong approach for many reasons; for example an adversary can choose supe-
rior values to avoid the rejection of speciﬁc frames, as the frame counter uses incrementing values rather than
random values. It is also easy to overﬂow the frame counters; as pointed out in previous published studies6, an
attacker might cause rejection of further frames and produce a denial of service simply by forging a frame with
the maximum value 0xFFFFFFFF.
3. Forward security: Another weakness that can be found in the ZigBee security model is that the forward security
requirement is not addressed properly (despite high security mode). Upon leaving the network, a node is still
able to access the communication, because it still possesses the master and link keying material, due to the fact
that a proper revocation has not been done. Indeed, if we take as an example a company or an institution using
ZigBee for opening doors or improving energy eﬃciency etc, such a place needs a good approach to manage
thousands of ZigBee devices. And a very possible situation is where one or many of the ZigBee devices are lost,
misused or stolen. Using practical experiment, studies show that the extraction of security keys is possible3 4.
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Fig. 2. Proposed security solution for enabled ZigBee wireless sensor networks
Thus, the extraction of data become very feasible, and this has been already demonstrated in published research
projects like3 4. For that reason, if the keys stored on the devices are not properly revoked an adversary might
take advantage of the situation, and exploit this weakness. As such attacking the network and application level
becomes a very feasible task. Therefore, this type of attacks should not be underestimated and must be taken
seriously.
4. Eavesdropping and data manipulation: More security vulnerabilities related to ZigBee enabled systems were
demonstrated. For example, special software and hardware can be used for attacking purposes such as eaves-
dropping (traﬃc sniﬃng), data injection/manipulation or packet decoding. Cheap $40 devices like AVR RZ
Raven USB (Universal Serial Bus) Stick (RZUSB) can be used to exploit many security vulnerabilities related to
ZigBee enabled systems7. Furthermore, an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) based on GNUCompiler
Collection (GCC) is a freely available for software development7. Another example is the KillerBee software
suite7, which is a modiﬁed version of RZUSB ﬁrmware. This tool is also capable of exploiting ZigBee vulner-
abilities and is freely available software suite7. It is expected that these tools will be enhanced to be even more
eﬃcient in the near future, exposing more currently unknown ZigBee weaknesses.
We propose in the next section a new approach to ﬁx the discussed weaknesses.
4. Proposed Solution
Three entities are involved in this proposal: the Trust Center, the initiator node A, and the responder node B. Each
node i stores its identiﬁer IDi and its secret key Ki. The Trust Center has access to a database where information
related to the network is stored (in this case we are interested in the IDs and secret keys related to the nodes). No
keys are shared permanently among the nodes, which decreases considerably the ability to compromise the network
upon the exposure of one single node. Finally, the temporary session key Ks, is a one-time-use key shared between
both the initiator and responder nodes during a given communication. In our approach, we propose to use random
numbers as nonces to ensure the freshness of the messages containing the session keys. The nonce Ni is updated after
each communication to prevent replay attacks. We use the following notations to describe our solution throughout the
paper:
TC Trust Center
A Initiator node
B Responder node
IDi Identiﬁer of a node i
Ni A random number generated by a node i
Ki The secret key of a given node i
Hi The output of the hash function h(Ni,Ki)
EK(M) An encrypted message M with a key K
KS One time use session key.
• Step 1: The initiator A sends a request to establish communication with the node B. The message (1) contains
the node’s identiﬁer IDA, a nonce NA generated by A and HA which is a hash of NA along with the private key
KA. We added the nonce to this step to provide freshness and ensure that when receiving the next message, A
will be sure that the communication has not been replayed as NA is random and diﬀerent for each session. Only
the Trust Center has access to KA and can rebuild HA to verify if A is a legitimate node. Note that HA is a one
380   Wissam Razouk et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  37 ( 2014 )  376 – 381 
way function, as hash functions are required to be irreversible. Therefore, even if this message is disclosed, the
attack cannot be successful, as only legitimate parties possess the secret key KA to recover the plain message of
the next step.
• Step 2: The responder B build its own message in the same way, and sends the received information related
to A along with its information to the Trust Center as a request for authentication and also to obtain a new
temporary session key.
• Step 3: The Trust Center (TC) receives the message (2) from B, and veriﬁes at ﬁrst whether the forwarded
message is valid or not by rebuilding H′A and H
′
B using KA and KB for the stored IDA and IDB respectively.
Comparing H′A with HA and H
′
B with HB proves the message is legitimate as only A and B possess the secret
keys KA and KB and are able to build a valid message.
• Step 4: The trust center generate a the session key KS, and sends it in an encrypted form using KA and KB
to both A and B respectively. The nonces NA and NB provide protection against replay attacks. Note that in
our solution, both nodes A and B authenticate as legitimate nodes, and can verify the freshness of the received
messages from the Trust Center.
• Step 5: Finally the nodes A and B receive the encrypted information, and retrieve the secret session key using
their private keys KA and KB respectively. A and B are sure that the received message is fresh as it contains the
nonces NA and NB. At this point, both the initiator A and the responder B can communicate in a secure way
using the session key KS. The proposed solution can be easily understood by looking at Fig. 2.
The Trust Center can make a periodical veriﬁcation, and verify if all nodes are still in the WSN. If not, TC can revoke
the access from a speciﬁc node simply by deleting or disabling its related information in the data base. This technique
prevents from exploiting secret information by an adversary.
5. Security And Performance Analysis
5.1. Security Analysis
In our scheme the session key is not distributed using a Master key. Therefore it is unlikely that the network gets
compromised upon a disclose of a speciﬁc key (which the case of the Master key in the original protocol). This is
mainly due to the fact that the secrete key of each node is used to encrypt the message containing the temporary
session key. Secondly, we use a random number to provide freshness of the exchange message, while in the original
ZigBee protocol the notion of frame counter is adopted, and an ordered sequence of input is used to reject replayed
frames, which is not a strong approach as an adversary can choose speciﬁc values to avoid the rejection of the frames.
Our solution has also the following properties:
Data Secrecy: The information transmitted between the Trust Center and the nodes A and B is not understandable
by a potential attacker as diﬀerent private keys are used to communicate with each node. While in the original security
protocol used by ZigBee devices the Link key is either transmitted in clear or by using the Master key that is shared
among all nodes increasing the possibility of the compromise of the entire network. In our approach, each node stores
an identiﬁer and a private key to secure the communication. The hash function is irreversible and is also required to
be a one-way function.
Resist replay attacks: Our solution is designed to counter replay attacks. In each session diﬀerent random num-
bers are included in the message exchanges to prevent this type of vulnerability. For example, an eavesdropper could
try to impersonate the Trust Center and replay one of its previous responses; however, the message would not be
validated by the nodes, as the nonce included in the message would not be fresh, and would not match the nonce in
the request message. Thus, the message would not match the veriﬁcation and the attack would fail. Therefore, our
approach resists replay attacks.
Authentication: This feature is important for many applications. In our approach, only legitimate parties that
possess the secret keys KA and KB can create valid messages, and only genuine nodes can derive the session keys KS.
Also the message exchange involves a hash function that allows data integrity to be checked.
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Resist impersonation attack: For example, an adversary can try to be authenticated as a certain node, and gain
access to the communication without being authorized to do so. In this case, the attack would not be successful,
because the secret keys KA and KB are unknown; therefore, it is not possible to retrieve the session key KS.
5.2. Static Performance Assessment
In addition to providing many security properties against several possible attacks on the ZigBee systems, our
solution has low computational cost, and ﬁts constrained wireless sensor networks in terms of communication and
storage requirements.
Computation cost: Standard cryptographic algorithms like public key systems have a very high computational
cost, and need large memory space. Therefore these kinds of methods are not suitable for very constrained devices
such as wireless sensor nodes. Our proposal requires only a hash function to be implemented and a random number
generator. Both the nodes and the Trust Center have enough computational power to handle cryptographic operations
based on symmetric key cryptosystem.
Communication Cost: Our solution is accomplished with only four messages between the Trust Center and
the nodes, versus nine messages in the original ZigBee security protocol. Therefore, the proposed scheme reduces
considerably the communication overheads and is considered practical and feasible.
Storage requirement: Each node needs only to store its private key, instead of three diﬀerent keys in the original
protocol (Master, link and network key). In addition to the implementation of the hash function and the random
number generator. The nonce is stored in a rewritable memory because it needs updates. This is considered very low
compared to the original ZigBee security protocol. Thus, the proposed solution is lightweight and practical.
6. Conclusion
We have presented the security model of ZigBee, this model has improved considerably through many expert re-
views. However, the model presents deﬁciencies that may limit its application, and several attacks are still possible
as mentioned in this paper. This work is an attempt to highlight the most relevant weaknesses and proposes a new ap-
proach to enhance security. Our solution is eﬃcient and prevents many security attacks. Moreover, the computational
cost and storage requirements are quite low compared to standard solutions.
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